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  OPINION 
________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
I. Introduction 
This suit was brought in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Jersey by Wal-Mart cleaning crew 
members who are seeking compensation for unpaid 
overtime and certification of a collective action under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), civil damages under 
RICO, and damages for false imprisonment.  The 
workers – illegal immigrants who took jobs with 
contractors and subcontractors Wal-Mart engaged to 
clean its stores – allege:  (1) Wal-Mart had hiring and 
firing authority over them and closely directed their 
actions such that Wal-Mart was their employer under the 
FLSA; (2) Wal-Mart took part in a RICO enterprise with 
predicate acts of transporting illegal immigrants, 
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harboring illegal immigrants, encouraging illegal 
immigration, conspiracy to commit money laundering, 
and involuntary servitude; (3) Wal-Mart‘s practice of 
locking some stores at night and on weekends – without 
always having a manager available with a key – 
constituted false imprisonment. 
Over the course of eight years and a minimum of 
four opinions, the District Court rejected final 
certification of an FLSA class, rejected the RICO claim 
on several grounds, and rejected the false imprisonment 
claim on the merits.  We will affirm. 
II. Facts 
This case has been pending for over eight years 
and ultimately comes to us from a grant of summary 
judgment.  Not surprisingly, it carries with it a substantial 
record.
1
  To help organize the relevant facts in a useful 
                                              
1
 This case provides a useful example of why the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for a joint 
appendix and give each party the authority to designate 
any relevant documents for inclusion.  See Fed. R. App. 
P. 30(b)(1).  Rather than cooperate to produce a joint 
appendix, the parties here have provided one primary 
appendix and two sets of supplemental appendices (one 
from each side).  This unnecessarily complicates the 
record on appeal, and we strongly discourage parties 
from pursuing such a course in the future.   
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manner, we have divided them into groups corresponding 
to Plaintiffs‘ claims.  We focus only on the facts relevant 
to our bases for deciding the appeal. 
A. RICO 
Plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart paid its contractors 
with full knowledge that the contractors were hiring 
illegal immigrants to work in Wal-Mart‘s stores.  
Plaintiffs support this contention with further allegations 
that two senior Wal-Mart executives made comments that 
could be understood as acknowledging that the 
contractors had hired and would continue to hire illegal 
immigrants.  In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart 
managers and executives were regularly informed that 
their contractors were employing illegal immigrants. 
In support of their RICO transporting predicate, 
Plaintiffs allege that contractors would sometimes pick 
workers up from the airport and transport them across 
state lines for work.  They also allege that when a work 
crew was arrested by federal authorities, fired / ejected 
by the store manager, or otherwise unavailable to work, 
another work crew would be brought in within hours, 
often from out of state.  In support of their RICO 
harboring predicate, Plaintiffs allege at least one instance 
in which work crews were permitted to sleep in the store 
and keep their personal belongings there with the 
knowledge of store management.  In support of their 
RICO encouraging predicate, Plaintiffs allege that 
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contractors advertised for Wal-Mart cleaning jobs in the 
Czech Republic and elsewhere.  In support of their RICO 
involuntary servitude predicate, Plaintiffs allege that they 
were coerced into working by threats to report their 
immigration status to authorities.  Plaintiffs also use the 
facts supporting their false imprisonment claims to 
support their involuntary servitude claims.  Those facts 
will be discussed below. 
The record indicates that Plaintiffs did not work 
exclusively for Wal-Mart, nor did Wal-Mart hire its 
cleaners exclusively from the pool of illegal immigrants 
it allegedly transported, harbored, and encouraged.  For 
example, documents and deposition testimony provided 
by Plaintiffs demonstrate that they held a variety of jobs, 
including work at a Marriott hotel, work at a movie 
theater, and work remodeling homes.  And the record 
indicates that Wal-Mart often used store associates 
(regular, non-contract employees) to clean its stores. 
B. Certification of the FLSA Collective Action 
The District Court‘s decision to decertify the 
collective action followed substantial discovery into the 
potential class plaintiffs, their employment history, their 
work hours, their working conditions, and other relevant 
factors.  Magistrate Judge Arleo, to whom some of the 
proceedings below were assigned, required each opt-in 
plaintiff to file a questionnaire in a specific format 
detailing his / her personal information, working 
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conditions, compensation, etc.  Over one hundred 
individuals filed this questionnaire before the deadline.  
The questionnaires demonstrate that the opt-in plaintiffs 
worked at dozens of different stores, for numerous 
different contractors, with various pay amounts and 
methods.  Though most worked every evening from 
roughly 11pm – 7am, their hours sometimes varied. 
In an effort to demonstrate that the proposed class 
is similarly situated, Plaintiffs proffer a Wal-Mart 
Maintenance Manual (and a translation of that manual 
into Polish), which appears to establish uniform 
standards and procedures for cleaning Wal-Mart stores.  
The manual is comprehensive.  Among other things, it 
specifies the products and methods to be used, as well as 
the procedure for obtaining new supplies or equipment.    
In a similar vein, Plaintiffs provide declarations and 
deposition testimony establishing that Wal-Mart provided 
the cleaning materials used by the crew, though at least 
one Wal-Mart store manager asserts that contractors 
provided their own equipment. 
In an effort to demonstrate that Wal-Mart 
exercised control over the proposed class and that this 
control was common across Wal-Mart stores, Plaintiffs 
provide declarations and deposition testimony supporting 
their contention that Wal-Mart managers directed them 
where and how to clean and often scrutinized their work, 
requiring them to clean an area more thoroughly before 
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leaving.  Wal-Mart provides declarations from store 
managers insisting that their interactions with crews were 
limited to general instructions.  They insist that they did 
not supervise the cleaners and that issues were usually 
raised with the crew chief or the contracting company.    
Plaintiffs concede in their own deposition testimony that 
cleaners did not receive training from Wal-Mart staff.  
Generally, cleaners were trained by other members of the 
work crew or learned simply by observing.   
Plaintiffs also claim that Wal-Mart asserted and 
exercised the right to hire and fire the cleaning crews.  
Plaintiffs point first to a form contract distributed to Wal-
Mart stores to be used in hiring cleaning crews.  The 
letter accompanying the contract and the contract itself 
specify that the Wal-Mart store manager shall have final 
authority to approve or disapprove members of the 
cleaning crew.  In addition, Plaintiffs provide 
declarations and deposition testimony establishing that 
Wal-Mart management would occasionally fire 
individual workers or whole work crews.  Multiple Wal-
Mart managers provide declarations asserting that they 
did not have the authority to hire and fire crew members. 
C. False Imprisonment 
In support of their false imprisonment claims, 
Plaintiffs allege that they often worked at stores that were 
shut down at night and on weekends, during which time 
the exits were locked.  At these stores, they needed to 
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seek out managers to open the doors.  Managers were 
often unavailable and were sometimes not even in the 
store.  However, Plaintiffs‘ deposition testimony shows 
that they could and sometimes did leave for breaks.    
Testimony also shows that they occasionally left for 
work-related tasks like retrieving propane (necessary for 
the buffing equipment). 
Plaintiffs cite two specific instances in which they 
wanted to leave but were unable to do so:  (1) Plaintiff 
Petr Zednik had a toothache and wanted to leave early, 
but his manager, Steve, refused to permit him to leave; 
(2) Plaintiff Teresa Jaros had abdominal pain and 
bleeding and wanted to leave, but no managers were in 
the store.  In Zednik‘s case, he further asserts that ―Steve 
is a muscular man (with blond hair), and I knew that he 
would assault me if I tried to escape through any door 
that would let me out[.]‖ 
In response, Wal-Mart provides two declarations 
from store managers.  The declarations attest that 
managers were available to unlock doors ―when 
necessary‖; that the stores had properly-marked 
emergency exits; and that – to the managers‘ knowledge 
– the emergency exits were neither concealed nor 
obstructed at any time and were always in proper 
working order. 
In reply to these declarations, Plaintiffs assert that 
managers were often unavailable.  They also assert that 
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they did not know how to leave.  Plaintiffs claim that 
they were never informed of the location of emergency 
exits.  Plaintiffs also speculate that Wal-Mart had motive 
to conceal these exits. 
III. Procedural Timeline 
The initial complaint in this case was filed on 
November 10, 2003, and the case was assigned to then-
District Judge Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.  The original 
complaint was followed by a First Amended Class 
Action Complaint on February 2, 2004.  This complaint 
sought damages for:  (1) RICO (with predicate acts of 
transporting, harboring, encouraging, and hiring illegal 
immigrants, conspiracy / aiding and abetting 
transporting, harboring, and encouraging illegal 
immigrants, committing immigration offenses for 
financial gain, involuntary servitude, money laundering, 
mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy to launder money); 
(2) RICO conspiracy; (3) conspiracy to violate civil 
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (4) violations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.  On December 29, 2004, the 
District Court conditionally certified the FLSA collective 
action. 
On October 7, 2005, ruling on a motion to dismiss,  
the District Court concluded that:  (1) Plaintiffs failed to 
state a claim for any of their alleged RICO predicates; (2) 
Plaintiffs were not members of a class protected by 42 
U.S.C. § 1985; and (3) Plaintiffs‘ FLSA and false 
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imprisonment claims could proceed.  In response, 
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on 
November 21, 2005.  This complaint abandoned 
Plaintiffs‘ civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the 
RICO predicate of hiring illegal immigrants, the RICO 
predicate of money laundering (but not conspiracy to 
launder money), and the RICO predicate of mail and wire 
fraud. 
On August 28, 2006, deciding a partial motion to 
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, the District 
Court dismissed Plaintiffs‘ RICO and RICO conspiracy 
claims.  The District Court held:  (1) Plaintiffs failed to 
satisfy the RICO requirement of showing ―distinctness‖ 
between the ―person‖ and the ―RICO enterprise‖; (2) 
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for their RICO predicate 
of involuntary servitude; and (3) Plaintiffs failed to 
establish a causal nexus between their RICO predicates 
of immigration violations and money laundering and 
their alleged injury. 
On March 10, 2010, this case was reassigned to 
then-Chief District Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr.  On June 
25, 2010, the District Court granted Wal-Mart‘s motion 
to decertify Plaintiffs‘ provisionally-certified FLSA 
collective action.  The District Court concluded that the 
breadth of factual circumstances underlying each 
individual‘s claim did not permit trial of the case as a 
collective action.  On December 1, 2010, the District 
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Court denied Plaintiffs‘ motion for summary judgment 
on their FLSA and false imprisonment claims.  The 
District Court concluded that the motion was 
procedurally improper because it was filed well beyond 
the deadline provided by the federal rules.  The District 
Court also concluded that the motion failed on the merits 
because material facts remained in contention on both 
claims. 
On April 7, 2011, the District Court granted Wal-
Mart‘s motion for partial summary judgment on the false 
imprisonment claim.  It first concluded that Wal-Mart 
had shown adequate grounds for seeking summary 
judgment beyond the time limit provided by the federal 
rules.  It then held that Plaintiffs‘ false imprisonment 
claims failed on the merits because Wal-Mart had 
adequately demonstrated the availability of emergency 
exits and Plaintiffs failed to rebut this evidence.  
Following that decision, Wal-Mart resolved the 
individual FLSA claims of named Plaintiffs through a 
series of settlements and an offer of judgment. 
This appeal followed.  Plaintiffs challenge the 
District Court‘s dismissal of their RICO claims, its 
decertification of the conditionally-certified FLSA 
action, and its grant of summary judgment for Wal-Mart 
on Plaintiffs‘ false imprisonment claims.  The District 
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 29 U.S.C. 
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§ 216(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
IV. Analysis 
A. Certification of the FLSA Collective Action 
The District Court conditionally certified this as a 
collective action under the FLSA.  Following discovery, 
a ―motion for decertification‖ was brought, and the 
District Court ―decertified‖2 the class.  As the District 
Court explained, two different standards apply for 
certification under the FLSA, one for conditional 
certification, and another for final certification.  While 
we have made clear that the standard for final 
certification is more stringent than the standard for 
conditional certification, the exact test to be applied has 
been left specifically unresolved by our Court.  We 
decide today that to certify an FLSA collective action for 
trial, the District Court – after considering the claims and 
defenses of the parties and all the relevant evidence – 
must make a finding of fact that the members of the 
collective action are ―similarly situated.‖  The burden of 
demonstrating that members of the collective action are 
similarly situated is to be borne by the plaintiffs, who 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they 
are similarly situated. 
                                              
2
 This terminology is misleading, as we will demonstrate. 
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1. Standard of Review 
We must first address  the appropriate standard of 
review.  The standard of review for FLSA decertification 
has not been previously addressed by our Court.  Other 
circuits have applied an abuse of discretion standard to 
the ultimate decision on whether to certify the collective 
action.  See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 
551 F.3d 1233, 1260 (11th Cir. 2008) (―[W]e review a 
district court‘s § 216(b) certification for abuse of 
discretion.‖); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 




We agree that an abuse of discretion standard is 
appropriate.  But we note that this is not the type of abuse 
of discretion review afforded matters that are ―committed 
to the discretion of the trial court[.]‖  United States v. 
Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981).  In those 
situations, we will reverse only if the district court‘s 
decision is ―arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is 
another way of saying that discretion is abused only 
where no reasonable man would take the view adopted 
by the local court.‖  Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. 
                                              
3
 Thiessen is an ADEA case.  Throughout this section, we 
will use FLSA and ADEA cases interchangeably, as the 
ADEA imports by reference the collective action 
provision and ―similarly situated‖ standard of the FLSA.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). 
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Radiator, Etc., 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976) (en 
banc) (quoting Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 
965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942)).  Here, however, we will find 
an abuse of discretion ―if the district court‘s decision 
‗rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.‘‖  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 
F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 
(3d Cir. 2001)). 
This type of review is appropriate because the final 
certification of an FLSA collective action is composed of 
two underlying components:  (1) determining the legal 
standard to be applied in concluding whether proposed 
plaintiffs are similarly situated; and (2) applying the legal 
standard to conclude whether the proposed plaintiffs 
actually are similarly situated.  The former has been 
recognized as a legal question, subject to de novo review.  
See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105 (―The initial question, 
which we address de novo, is whether it was proper for 
the district court to adopt the ad hoc approach in 
determining whether plaintiffs were ‗similarly situated‘ 
for purposes of § 216(b).‖).  The latter has been 
recognized as a factual question, subject to review for 
clear error.  See Morgan, 551 F.3d 1260 (―A court‘s 
determination that the evidence shows a particular group 
of opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated is a finding of 
fact. . . . We will reverse the district court‘s fact-finding 
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that plaintiffs are similarly situated only if it is clearly 
erroneous.‖); Mooney v. Aramco Servs., 54 F.3d 1207, 
1214 (5th Cir. 1995) (―At [the second] stage, the court 
. . . makes a factual determination on the similarly 
situated question.‖), overruled on other grounds by 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
Once it has been determined that the plaintiffs are 
similarly situated (a factual question reviewed for clear 
error), there is no further work to be done.  We do not 
believe that the statute gives the district court discretion 
to deny certification after it has determined that plaintiffs 
are similarly situated.  Accordingly, no exercise of 
discretion actually takes place.  Nonetheless, such multi-
part reviews of District Court decisions have been 
routinely labeled with the ―abuse of discretion‖ standard 
under our precedent and the precedent of our sister 
circuits, though we have made clear that each part of the 
review should proceed under the appropriate standard for 
that component.  See, e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
655 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2011); Morgan v. Perry, 142 
F.3d 670, 682-83 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Because we are examining the underlying legal 
rule for certification, we exercise plenary review over the 
District Court‘s decision to not finally certify the 
collective action here.  Going forward, however, because 
district courts will be applying the standard we announce 
today, we anticipate that certification decisions will 
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typically be subject to review under the clear-error prong 
of this type of abuse of discretion review, as only fact-
finding should be at issue. 
2. Standard for Certification of an 
FLSA Collective Action 
In ―decertifying‖ this collective action, the District 
Court explained that two different standards for 
certification applied.  It noted that a ―fairly lenient 
standard‖ applied for conditional certification, and noted 
that some courts ―require nothing more than substantial 
allegations that the putative class members were together 
the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan[.]‖  
Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5309, 2010 WL 
2652510, at *2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2010) (quoting Morisky 
v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 493, 495 
(D.N.J. 2000)).  The District Court then held that a 
―stricter standard‖ applied on final certification, in which 
the court actually determines whether the plaintiffs are 
similarly situated.  And it held that plaintiffs bear the 
burden of demonstrating that they are similarly situated.  
Without precisely quantifying the burden borne by the 
plaintiffs, the District Court then concluded that, under 
the disparate factual circumstances applicable here, 
Plaintiffs were not similarly situated, and 
―decertification‖ was appropriate. 
In  Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 
189 (3d Cir. 2011), we noted that this two-tier approach, 
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while ―nowhere mandated, . . . appears to have garnered 
wide acceptance.‖  Id. at 193 n.5.  We implicitly 
embraced this two-step approach, and we affirm its use 
here.  But we also explained that the ―conditional 
certification‖ is not really a certification.  It is actually 
―‗the district court‘s exercise of [its] discretionary power, 
upheld in Hoffmann-La Roche, to facilitate the sending of 
notice to potential class members,‘ and ‗is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a 
representative action under [the] FLSA.‘‖  Id. at 194 
(quoting Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 
(2d Cir. 2010)).  In articulating the standard to be applied 
at this initial stage,
4
 we left open the question of the 
                                              
4
 We adopted the ―modest factual showing‖ standard, 
under which ―a plaintiff must produce some evidence, 
‗beyond pure speculation,‘ of a factual nexus between the 
manner in which the employer‘s alleged policy affected 
her and the manner in which it affected other 
employees.‖  Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 193 (citing Smith v. 
Sovereign Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-2420, 2003 WL 
22701017, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003)).  The Second 
Circuit has described this initial step as ―determin[ing] 
whether ‗similarly situated‘ plaintiffs do in fact exist,‖ 
while at the second stage, the District Court determines 
―whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact 
‗similarly situated‘ to the named plaintiffs.‖  Myers, 624 




standard to be applied on final certification.  Id. at 193 
n.6 (―Because only the notice stage is implicated in this 
appeal, we need not directly address the level of proof 
required to satisfy the similarly situated requirement at 
the post-discovery stage.‖). 
It is clear from the statutory text of the FLSA that 
the standard to be applied on final certification is whether 
the proposed collective plaintiffs are ―similarly 
situated.‖5  Courts have adopted three different 
approaches for determining whether this is the case.  See 
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-03.  The first is the ad-hoc 
approach, which considers all the relevant factors and 
makes a factual determination on a case-by-case basis.  
To our knowledge, this is the only approach approved by 
other Courts of Appeals.  See, e.g., Morgan, 551 F.3d at 
1259-62 (11th Cir. 2008); Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105 
(10th Cir. 2001).  The other two approaches are derived 
from Rule 23 and have only been adopted by district 
courts.  See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103.  We have already 
repeatedly approved the ad-hoc approach, and we do so 
again today.  See, e.g., Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 193 n.6; 
Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 388 n.17 (3d Cir. 
2007); Lockhard v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 
                                              
5
 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (―An action to recover the liability 
prescribed [by this statute] . . . may be maintained . . . by 
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself 
or themselves and other employees similarly situated.‖).  
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43, 51 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
Our Court and the other Courts of Appeals to 
address the issue have identified many factors to be 
considered as part of the ad-hoc analysis.  Relevant 
factors include (but are not limited to):  whether the 
plaintiffs are employed in the same corporate department, 
division, and location; whether they advance similar 
claims; whether they seek substantially the same form of 
relief; and whether they have similar salaries and 
circumstances of employment.  Plaintiffs may also be 
found dissimilar based on the existence of individualized 
defenses.  See Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 288 n.17.  This list is 
not exhaustive, and many relevant factors have been 
identified.  See 45C Am. Jur. 2d Job Discrimination 
§ 2184 (listing 14 factors to be considered in determining 
whether proposed collective action plaintiffs are 
―similarly situated‖ under the ADEA). 
Finally, we conclude that the burden is on the 
plaintiffs to establish that they satisfy the similarly 
situated requirement.  See Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 193 
(―Should the plaintiff satisfy her burden at [the second] 
stage, the case may proceed to trial as a collective 
action.‖); see also O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 
F.3d 567, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (―The lead plaintiffs bear 
the burden of showing that the opt-in plaintiffs are 
similarly situated to the lead plaintiffs.‖).   
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What remains unresolved is the level of proof the 
plaintiffs must satisfy.  In Symczyk, we specifically 
declined to answer this question.  Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 
193 n.6 (―Because only the notice stage is implicated in 
this appeal, we need not directly address the level of 
proof required at the post-discovery stage.‖).  To our 
knowledge, no other Court of Appeals has directly 
answered this question. 
  We now hold that plaintiffs must satisfy their 
burden at this second stage by a preponderance of the 
evidence.
6
  As the Second Circuit observed, the task on 
final certification is determining ―whether the plaintiffs 
who have opted in are in fact ‗similarly situated‘ to the 
named plaintiffs.‖  Myers, 624 F.3d at 555.  That seems 
impossible unless Plaintiffs can at least get over the line 
of ―more likely than not.‖  At the same time, a stricter 
standard would be inconsistent with Congress‘ intent that 
the FLSA should be liberally construed.  See Morgan, 
551 F.3d at 1265 (―We also bear in mind that the FLSA 
is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed.‖). 
                                              
6
 Because this issue is necessary to our decision and was 
not directly addressed in the original briefs, we requested 
supplemental briefing.  Wal-Mart asserted that a 
preponderance standard applied.  In their brief, the 
Plaintiffs did not articulate a precise burden.  But at oral 
argument, both parties agreed that a preponderance of the 
evidence standard was appropriate. 
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Our conclusion that preponderance of the evidence 
is the appropriate standard to apply is buttressed by the 
Supreme Court‘s presumption ―that this standard is 
applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless 
‗particularly important individual interests or rights are at 
stake.‘‖  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).  
And we have said that ―[w]e see no reason to deviate 
from the traditional preponderance of the evidence 
standard in the absence of express direction from 
Congress.‖  United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 161 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
We hold that plaintiffs must demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that members of a 
proposed collective action are similarly situated in order 
to obtain final certification and proceed with the case as a 
collective action. 
3. Application of the FLSA 
Certification Standard 
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the ―similarly 
situated‖ standard.  The similarities among the proposed 
plaintiffs are too few, and the differences among the 
proposed plaintiffs are too many. 
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Plaintiffs‘ theory is that Wal-Mart wanted clean 
stores ―on the cheap.‖7  To that end, Wal-Mart distributed 
a maintenance manual that went into exacting detail 
about how to clean floors, shelves, bathrooms, and other 
parts of the store.  This manual mandated procedures that 
all employees and contractors were to use.  Store 
managers also received a form contract for use with 
outside cleaning contractors, and were instructed that 
they had final authority to approve or disapprove 
members of cleaning crews.  There is evidence that store 
managers fired members of cleaning crews and that Wal-
Mart employees regularly directed cleaning crews in 
conducting their work in the store.  There is also 
evidence that Wal-Mart store managers and corporate 
officers knew and approved of contractors‘ widespread 
hiring of illegal immigrants. 
                                              
7
 For purposes of this analysis, we will recite the facts as 
set forth by the Plaintiffs.  This is not required by the 
certification analysis, but we do so to demonstrate that, 
even reciting the facts to Plaintiffs‘ benefit, Plaintiffs are 
unable to meet their burden for certification.  We note 
that Wal-Mart disputes many of these facts, such as the 
provenance of the maintenance manual and how 
widespread was its use, the hiring and firing authority of 
store managers, etc.  We do not purport to resolve these 




Being similarly situated does not mean simply 
sharing a common status, like being an illegal immigrant.  
Rather, it means that one is subjected to some common 
employer practice that, if proved, would help 
demonstrate a violation of the FLSA.  And, indeed, 
Plaintiffs‘ allegation of a common scheme to hire and 
underpay illegal immigrant workers provides some 
common link among the proposed class.  Plaintiffs‘ 
evidence with regard to the maintenance manual, the 
authority of store managers, and the supervision by store 
employees is relevant to demonstrating whether Wal-
Mart employed the proposed plaintiffs.  And such a 
scheme potentially demonstrates Wal-Mart‘s willfulness 
in violating the FLSA.  But these common links are of 
minimal utility in streamlining resolution of these cases.  
Liability and damages still need to be individually 
proven. 
While the District Court noted the commonalities 
among the proposed plaintiffs, it was ultimately 
convinced that the class should not be certified for trial.  
―In all,‖ it found, ―the putative class members worked in 
180 different stores in 33 states throughout the country 
and for 70 different contractors and subcontractors.  The 
individuals worked varying hours and for different wages 
depending on the contractor.‖  Zavala, No. 03-5309, 
2010 WL 2652510, at *3 (internal citations omitted).  
These factors convinced the District Court that there 
were ―significant differences in the factual and 
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employment settings of the individual claimants.‖  Id.  
The District Court also noted that different defenses 
might be available to Wal-Mart with respect to each 
proposed plaintiff, including that individual cleaners 
were not Wal-Mart employees, as that term is defined by 
the FLSA, and that it paid some of its contractors an 
adequate amount to support an appropriate wage for the 
cleaners.  See id. at *4-*5. 
We agree with the District Court.  Considering the 
numerous differences among members of the proposed 
class in light of the alleged common scheme‘s minimal 
utility in streamlining resolution of the claims, we 
conclude that the Plaintiffs have not met their burden of 
demonstrating that they are similarly situated.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court‘s decision to deny 
final certification. 
B. Civil RICO Claims 
Plaintiffs originally alleged RICO violations with 
underlying predicate acts of transporting, harboring, 
encouraging, and hiring illegal immigrants, mail and wire 
fraud, money laundering, and related conspiracy and 
aiding and abetting claims.  The District Court then 
dismissed Plaintiffs‘ civil RICO claims for failure to state 
a claim on the underlying predicate acts.  See Zavala v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 304 (D.N.J. 
2005).  When Plaintiffs later amended their complaint, 
they dropped the predicate acts of hiring illegal 
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immigrants and mail and wire fraud.  In its subsequent 
opinion, the District Court took a different approach.  It 
first held that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for the 
predicate act of involuntary servitude.  But for the other 
predicate acts – transporting illegal immigrants, 
concealing illegal immigrants, harboring illegal 
immigrants, conspiracy / aiding and abetting claims for 
each of these, and conspiracy to commit money 
laundering – the District Court held that Plaintiffs had 
failed to show a causal nexus between these acts and 
their alleged injury.  It also held that Plaintiffs had failed 
to satisfy RICO‘s distinctness requirement.  See Zavala v. 
Wal-Mart, 447 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D.N.J. 2006).  For these 
independent reasons, the District Court again dismissed 
Plaintiffs‘ RICO allegations for failure to state a claim. 
In its later opinion, the District Court did not 
disavow its prior holding that Zavala had failed to plead 
at least two predicate acts, and Wal-Mart renews this 
argument on appeal.  See Appellee‘s Br. at 24.   Wal-
Mart is correct.  We conclude that Plaintiffs have failed 
to state a claim for RICO or RICO conspiracy by failing 
to allege a pattern of predicate acts.
8
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 We also have serious doubt that the Plaintiffs have met 
the pleading requirements for RICO distinctness and 
proximate causation, but we do not need to reach those 




On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
our review is plenary.  See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  The complaint‘s 
―[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level.‖  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).   
1. Pleading of the RICO Conspiracy 
Claim 
In addition to their RICO claim, Plaintiffs also 
claim conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(d) (―It shall be unlawful for any person to 
conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection 
(a), (b), or (c) of this section.‖).  RICO conspiracy is not 
a mere conspiracy to commit the underlying predicate 
acts.  It is a conspiracy to violate RICO – that is, to 
conduct or participate in the activities of a corrupt 
enterprise.  See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62 
(1997) (―Before turning to RICO‘s conspiracy provision, 
we note the substantive RICO offense, which was the 
goal of the conspiracy[.]‖ (emphasis added)); Banks v. 
Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990) (―[A] defendant 
can be liable under RICO‘s conspiracy provision for 
agreeing to the commission of a pattern of racketeering 
activity.‖ (emphasis added)); United States v. Elliott, 571 
F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978) (―[T]he object of a RICO 
conspiracy is to violate a substantive RICO provision 
here, to conduct or participate in the affairs of an 
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enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and 
not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes 
necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering 
activity.‖).  Plaintiffs fail to plead facts supporting a 
conclusion that this was the object of the alleged 
conspiracy.  Accordingly, the dismissal of Plaintiffs‘ 
claim under Section 1962(d) was not error.  It is an 
entirely separate question whether Plaintiffs allege a 
conspiracy to commit money laundering or immigration 
violations, which would then constitute predicate acts for 
a traditional RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  We 
will turn to that contention later in this opinion. 
2. Pleading of the RICO Predicates 
a) Pleading of the RICO 
Involuntary Servitude Predicate 
Plaintiffs claim that the conditions of their 
employment amount to involuntary servitude, barred by 
15 U.S.C. § 1584.  Per 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), this is a 
RICO predicate act.  The District Court concluded that 
Plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible claim of involuntary 
servitude.  We agree.  
―[T]he phrase ‗involuntary servitude‘ was intended 
. . . ‗to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to 
African slavery[.]‘‖  United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 
931, 942 (1988) (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 
332 (1916)).  ―Modern day examples of involuntary 
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servitude have been limited to labor camps, isolated 
religious sects, or forced confinement.‖  Steirer v. 
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 
1993); see, e.g., United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 
1280 (6th Cir. 1988) (religious sect violated 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1584 where they ―used and threatened to use physical 
force to make the children [at their camp] perform labor 
and the children believed they had no viable alternative 
but to perform such labor‖); United States v. Booker, 655 
F.2d 562, 563, 566 (4th Cir. 1981) (migrant labor camp 
held farm workers in involuntary servitude, forbade them 
from leaving without paying their debts, and enforced the 
rule with threats of physical harm, actual physical injury, 
and by kidnapping and returning to the farm workers who 
attempted to leave); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 131-
32 (2d Cir. 1966) (patients in mental institution 
performing required labor stated Thirteenth Amendment 
claim). 
Plaintiffs have presented evidence of some 
difficult working conditions, but they have demonstrated 
nothing ―akin to African slavery‖ or any modern 
analogue.  Any such comparison is plainly frivolous.  
Plaintiffs do not allege that they were held in a labor 
camp or forced into daily labor by a religious sect.  Any 
allegation that their working conditions constituted 
forced confinement falls with their false imprisonment 
claims, discussed later in this opinion. 
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To the extent Plaintiffs allege that they were 
threatened with deportation, those allegations are 
likewise insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude.  
In United States v. Kozminski, the Supreme Court 
observed that it was ―possible‖ that threatening an 
immigrant with deportation might amount to a ―threat of 
legal coercion‖ resulting in involuntary servitude.  487 
U.S. at 948.  At the same time, the Court endorsed Judge 
Friendly's observation in United States v. Shackney, 333 
F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964):  ―The most ardent believer in 
civil rights legislation might not think that cause would 
be advanced by permitting the awful machinery of the 
criminal law to be brought into play whenever an 
employee asserts that his will to quit has been subdued 
by a threat which seriously affects his future welfare but 
as to which he still has a choice, however painful.‖  
Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 950 (quoting Shackney, 333 F.2d 
at 487).  In Shackney, the Second Circuit further held: 
[W]e see no basis for concluding that 
because the statute can be satisfied by a 
credible threat of imprisonment, it should 
also be considered satisfied by a threat to 
have the employee sent back to the country 
of his origin, at least absent circumstances 
which would make such deportation 
equivalent to imprisonment or worse. . . . 
[A] holding in involuntary servitude means 
to us action by the master causing the 
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servant to have, or to believe he has, no way 
to avoid continued service or confinement, . 
. . not a situation where the servant knows 
he has a choice between continued service 
and freedom, even if the master has led him 
to believe that the choice may entail 
consequences that are exceedingly bad. . . . 
While a credible threat of deportation may 
come close to the line, it still leaves the 
employee with a choice, and we do not see 
how we could fairly bring it within § 1584 
without encompassing other types of threat. 
333 F.2d at 486-87 (internal citation omitted).  We agree 
with Judge Friendly‘s analysis.  Absent some special 
circumstances, threats of deportation are insufficient to 
constitute involuntary servitude. 
Plaintiffs do not claim that they were compelled to 
come to work each day.  While they allege that managers 
often kept them beyond the end of their shift to finish 
their work, they do not claim that they were forced to 
remain once that work was finished.  The record 
demonstrates that Plaintiffs often switched jobs, freely 
moving to different employers in different cities.  
Plaintiffs do not allege that previous employers ever 
pursued them to compel their return to a previous 
position.  And while a broad reading of Plaintiffs‘ 
allegations could lead to the conclusion that they were 
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threatened with deportation for refusing to work, that is 
legally insufficient to constitute involuntary servitude.  
The District Court properly concluded that the Plaintiffs 
had failed to adequately plead the RICO predicate of 
involuntary servitude. 
b) Pleading of the RICO 
Transporting Predicate 
Transporting illegal immigrants is prohibited as 
follows: 
Any person who— 
(i) knowing that a person is an alien, 
brings to or attempts to bring to the United 
States in any manner whatsoever such 
person at a place other than a designated 
port of entry or place other than as 
designated by the Commissioner, regardless 
of whether such alien has received prior 
official authorization to come to, enter, or 
reside in the United States and regardless of 
any future official action which may be 
taken with respect to such alien;  
(ii) knowing or in reckless disregard 
of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, 
or remains in the United States in violation 
of law, transports, or moves or attempts to 
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transport or move such alien within the 
United States by means of transportation or 
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation 
of law . . .   
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).  When done for 
monetary gain, this is a RICO predicate act.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F). 
Plaintiffs allege two types of scenarios that they 
believe constitute transporting:  (1) after work crews 
were fired or arrested, alternative work crews were 
quickly made available, often from other states; and (2)  
work crews were transported to work shifts.  Even 
assuming that any of these actions – had they been taken 
by Wal-Mart employees – qualify as ―transporting,‖9  
Plaintiffs do not demonstrate that Wal-Mart was 
responsible for the transporting.  Plaintiffs do not allege 
that Wal-Mart employees were ever involved in this 
transport.  Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts 
demonstrating that Wal-Mart aided and abetted transport.  
Plaintiffs do allege that Wal-Mart managers would 
sometimes request replacement crews, but they simply 
assert that the managers knew those crews would be 
illegal immigrants and that they would be transported 
                                              
9
 Plaintiffs admit, for example, that many workers 
entered the United States on visas and were therefore 
entitled to be here but not to work.  Transporting such an 
individual would not be illegal. 
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across state lines.  Even on a motion to dismiss, we are 
not required to credit mere speculation.  See Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 545. 
c) Pleading of the RICO 
Encouraging Predicate 
Encouraging illegal immigration is prohibited as 
follows: 
Any person who— 
 . . . . 
(iv) encourages or induces an alien to 
come to, enter, or reside in the United 
States, knowing or in reckless disregard of 
the fact that such coming to, entry, or 
residence is or will be in violation of law; 
. . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).  When done for monetary 
gain, this is a RICO predicate act.  18 U.S.C. § 
1961(1)(F). 
We have held that, to make out a claim of 
―encouraging,‖ Plaintiffs must prove that Wal-Mart 
engaged in an ―affirmative act that served as a catalyst 
for aliens to reside in the United States in violation of 
immigration law when they might not have otherwise.‖  
DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 
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249 (3d Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Henderson, 
No. 09-10028, 2012 WL 1432552, at *17 (D. Mass. Apr. 
25, 2012) (―[I]n light of the interpretation of the charging 
statute recently provided by the Third Circuit in DelRio-
Mocci, I am satisfied there is no question that those [jury] 
instructions were erroneous because they were too open 
textured and did not require the jury to find substantiality 
to any encouragement or inducement.‖). 
Plaintiffs do not allege that they would not or 
could not have resided in the United States without 
having been employed by Wal-Mart.  Moreover, while 
the plaintiffs did make allegations against various 
cleaning contractors that might be sufficient to state a 
claim of encouraging, ―the complaint fails to allege, as it 
must, that Wal-Mart took affirmative steps to assist 
Plaintiffs to enter or remain unlawfully in the United 
States, or that Wal-Mart agreed to undertake conduct 
with the purpose of unlawfully encouraging 
undocumented aliens.‖  Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 308.  
Thus, Plaintiffs cannot show that Wal-Mart‘s conduct 
incited aliens to remain in this country unlawfully when 
they otherwise might not have done so, and they 
therefore have not alleged that the company engaged in 
conduct sufficient to constitute encouraging or inducing. 
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d) Pleading of the RICO 
Harboring Predicate 
Harboring illegal immigrants is prohibited as 
follows: 
Any person who— 
 . . . . 
(iii) knowing or in reckless disregard 
of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, 
or remains in the United States in violation 
of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from 
detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or 
shield from detection, such alien in any 
place, including any building or any means 
of transportation; . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).  When done for monetary 
gain, this is a RICO predicate act.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
1961(1)(F). 
Plaintiffs‘ Second Amended Complaint alleges one 
set of facts that could plausibly support a claim of 
harboring.  Plaintiffs allege that, at Wal-Mart‘s store in 
Kansas City, Missouri, Wal-Mart allowed 
―undocumented aliens to sleep in a back room in the 
store and to keep their personal belongings there 
knowing (or acting in reckless disregard of the fact) that 
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they were undocumented aliens[.]‖   Giving Plaintiffs the 
benefit due their complaint on a motion to dismiss, we 
will assume Plaintiffs are alleging that Wal-Mart thereby 
provided housing to these cleaners (rather than simply a 
place to rest). 
Even if we assume that these facts support a 
harboring claim, Wal-Mart cannot be held responsible for 
the actions of a single store manager in Missouri in 
allowing illegal immigrants to live in the back of the 
store while working there as cleaners.  Plaintiffs do not 
claim that this decision was ratified by Wal-Mart senior 
executives, that it was common practice at Wal-Mart 
stores, or that it was within the manager‘s actual or 
apparent scope of authority.  See United States v. 
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 42 
(1st Cir. 1991) (―A corporation may be convicted for the 
criminal acts of its agents, under a theory of respondeat 
superior . . . where the agent is acting within the scope of 
employment.‖); United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 
54 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978) (―Under a respondeat superior 
theory of corporate criminal liability, the master‘s 
liability would depend on whether the servant‘s acts were 
within the ‗scope of the employment.‘  See Prosser, Torts 
351 (1955).  As Professor Prosser has described it, to be 
within the scope of the employment, the ‗servant‘s 
conduct‘ must be ‗the kind which he is authorized to 
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits 
of time and space, and is actuated at least in part, by a 
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desire to serve the master.‘  Id.‖).  Plaintiffs similarly fail 
to allege actions by Wal-Mart that would constitute 
aiding and abetting of harboring. 
e) Pleading of the RICO Money 
Laundering Conspiracy Predicate 
We agree with Plaintiffs that they have plausibly 
alleged a claim of conspiracy to commit money 
laundering.  But a single predicate act is not a pattern of 
predicate acts and therefore cannot support a RICO 
claim.  Thus, we agree with the District Court that 
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 
Plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart paid its contractors 
with full knowledge that those contractors were hiring 
illegal immigrants to work in Wal-Mart‘s stores.  
Plaintiffs support this contention with further allegations 
that two senior Wal-Mart executives made comments that 
could be understood as acknowledging that the 
contractors had hired and would continue to hire illegal 
immigrants.  In fact, one of these executives encouraged 
one of the cleaning contractors to form multiple 
companies so that contracts and payments could be 
distributed over a greater number of recipients.  This 
suggestion was allegedly made shortly after a federal 




Money paid to the ―shell‖ companies would 
facilitate the hiring of illegal workers.  Because Wal-
Mart is alleged to have known that many of those 
workers were illegal and that the companies would 
continue to hire illegal workers in the future, its intent to 
promote such activity can be inferred.  Therefore, 
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for money laundering 
because Wal-Mart had the ―intent . . . to promote the 
carrying on of specified unlawful activity‖ and 
―conduct[ed] or attempt[ed] to conduct a financial 
transaction involving . . . property  used to conduct or 
facilitate specified unlawful activity[.]‖  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(a)(3).  Unlike paragraph (a)(1) of the money 
laundering statute, paragraph (a)(3) does not require that 
the money used be the proceeds of illegal activity.  
Instead, the funds can be ―property used to conduct or 
facilitate specified unlawful activity.‖ 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(a)(3).   And these funds were allegedly used to 
conduct or facilitate the hiring of illegal immigrants. 
But one predicate act does not constitute a RICO 
pattern.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (―[A] ‗pattern of 
racketeering activity‘ requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity[.]‖).10  Therefore, we agree with the 
                                              
10
 We note that Plaintiffs, for whatever reason, have only 
pled a conspiracy to commit money laundering, not 
money laundering itself.  (A640)  Even if we assume that 
acts of money laundering resulted from this conspiracy, 
40 
 
District Court that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a 
claim. 
f) Pleading of the RICO 
Immigration Conspiracy Predicates 
We have concluded that Plaintiffs‘ allegations are 
insufficient to directly implicate Wal-Mart in the 
predicate acts of transporting, encouraging, or harboring.  
But Plaintiffs do allege facts that might support a 
conclusion that Wal-Mart‘s cleaning contractors engaged 
in these acts.  Plaintiffs also allege that Wal-Mart 
conspired with those contractors.  They support that 
claim with specific allegations that Wal-Mart executives 
acknowledged that contractors were hiring and would 
continue to hire illegal immigrants and that those 
contractors would continue to be hired by Wal-Mart.  At 
most, though, the facts alleged by the Plaintiffs constitute 
a conspiracy with the object of saving money through 
illegal hiring.  Even drawing all reasonable inferences in 
their favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to 
support a conspiracy with the purpose of transporting or 
                                                                                                     









C. False Imprisonment 
Plaintiffs‘ false imprisonment claims survived 
Wal-Mart‘s initial motion to dismiss.  Wal-Mart 
subsequently offered affidavits asserting that it locked its 
doors at night to provide security for its staff and 
merchandise, that managers were often available to open 
locked doors, and that Wal-Mart had accessible 
emergency exits, as required by state and federal law.  
Wal-Mart also argued that Plaintiffs‘ repeated return to 
stores where they were ―imprisoned‖ constituted consent.  
                                              
11
 Whether Plaintiffs‘ allegations in fact support claims of 
illegal hiring or conspiracy to commit illegal hiring is not 
before us, and is not an issue we purport to resolve.  We 
note, though, that the intent element required for 
establishing an illegal hiring violation is difficult to meet, 
a difficulty recognized by our sister circuits.  See, e.g., 
Walters v. McMahen, __ F.3d ____, 2012 WL 2589229, 
at *4 (4th Cir. 2012).  Given Plaintiffs‘ failure to plead a 
conspiracy to commit illegal hiring (and the insufficiency 
of Plaintiffs‘ allegations with respect to the conspiracies 
they did plead), we also have no occasion to consider 
whether predicate acts committed by co-conspirators in 
foreseeable furtherance of an alleged conspiracy 
predicate would themselves be RICO predicate acts.  Cf. 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
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In response, Plaintiffs:  (1)  cited specific instances where 
they wanted to leave and managers were unavailable or 
refused to let them leave; (2) noted that no one ever 
showed them the location of emergency exits and their 
minimal proficiency in English would make it difficult or 
impossible to find them on their own; and (3) argued that 
Wal-Mart had an interest in concealing emergency exits 
to prevent theft of merchandise and discovery of the 
illegal workers by federal agents.  On summary 
judgment, the District Court found Wal-Mart‘s assertions 
regarding the presence of emergency exits dispositive, as 
false imprisonment cannot occur where there is a safe 
alternative exit.  Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-
5309, 2011 WL 1337476 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2011).  We 
agree with the District Court‘s conclusion, though we 
will expand on the District Court‘s analysis. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the 
court to render summary judgment ―if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  ―[T]his standard provides 
that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material 
fact.‖  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
247-48 (1986).  An issue of material fact is ―genuine‖ if 
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
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verdict for the nonmoving party.  See id. at 257.  ―We 
exercise plenary review over a District Court‘s grant of 
summary judgment and review the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment 
was entered.‖  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 
130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). 
As this is a state law claim, the first question to be 
resolved is:  what state law should be applied?  After 
performing a choice-of-law analysis, the District Court 
applied New Jersey law.  Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  
We believe the District Court was correct in its choice of 
New Jersey law, and Plaintiffs do not dispute its 
application. 
The majority of Plaintiffs‘ false imprisonment 
claims fail because Plaintiffs impliedly consented to their 
―imprisonment.‖  Apparently from the very beginning of 
their employment, Plaintiffs were aware that Wal-Mart‘s 
policy was to close and lock the main doors of its stores 
when they are not open for business.  Plaintiffs 
nevertheless chose to continue coming to work.  They do 
not allege that they objected to the locked-door policy, 
nor do they allege that they requested a manager be 
available during their shift to open the doors.  Continuing 
to come to work under these conditions is ―conduct . . . 
reasonably understood by another to be intended as 
consent‖ and is therefore ―as effective as consent in fact.‖  
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892.
12
  As such, 
Plaintiffs ―cannot recover in an action of tort for the 
conduct or for harm resulting from it.‖  Id. at § 892A. 
But consent can be withdrawn, and Plaintiffs 
allege two instances when they wanted to leave but were 
unable to do so.  Teresa Jaros alleges that she was sick 
and wanted to leave, but no manager was available to 
open the door.  Petr Zednik alleges that he had a 
toothache, asked to leave, and was told he could not.  He 
also alleges that he believed his manager, a ―muscular‖ 
―blond‖ man, would assault him if he attempted to leave. 
Jaros‘ consent likely encompasses the incident she 
alleges.  By the time of her illness, she knew that she 
must work in a locked store for the duration of the shift.  
She knew that a manager would often be absent and 
therefore unable to open the door should a problem arise.  
(PSA211)  Her consent arguably includes that aspect of 
her work.  Consent only terminates ―when the actor 
                                              
12
 The New Jersey courts make frequent use of the 
Restatement, including in resolving false imprisonment 
cases.  See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 788 A.2d 867, 877 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Fair Oaks Hosp. v. 
Pocrass, 628 A.2d 829, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1993).  We have not seen any indication that the portions 
of the Restatement upon which we rely are contrary to 




knows or has reason to know that the other is no longer 
willing for him to continue the particular conduct.‖  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A cmt. h.  Since 
Wal-Mart was unaware that Jaros wanted to leave 
(because no manager was there), Jaros could not 
terminate her consent. 
Regardless, Jaros‘ complaint and Zednik‘s 
complaint are resolved by the availability of emergency 
exits.  ―To make the actor liable for false imprisonment, 
the other‘s confinement within the boundaries fixed by 
the actor must be complete.  . . . The confinement is 
complete although there is a reasonable means of escape, 
unless the other knows of it.‖  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 36.  While both Jaros and Zednik disclaim 
knowledge of the emergency exits, such knowledge is 
properly imputed to them, even over their proclaimed 
ignorance and even on summary judgment.  Federal Rule 
of Evidence 201 permits judicial notice of facts 
―generally known within the trial court‘s territorial 
jurisdiction‖ and we have noted that this includes 
―matters of common knowledge.‖  See Gov’t of Virgin 
Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 1975).  
Courts have used judicial notice to establish facts in 
similar situations.  See Williams v. Kerr Glass Mfg. 
Corp., 630 F. Supp. 266, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (taking 
judicial notice of the distance between federal courts in 
New York and Pennsylvania and the numerous means of 
transportation between them); Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. 
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Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (taking 
judicial notice of the ―layout and physical characteristics‖ 
of the New York City subway system, which the judge 
rode daily to work). 
Emergency exits are by regulation a common 
feature of commercial buildings in the United States.  We 
agree with the District Court that ―it appears . . . 
indisputable that these emergency exits are required by 
law to be clearly marked, easily accessible, and 
unobstructed.‖  Zavala, No. 03-5309, 2011 WL 1337476, 
at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).   We conclude 
that Jaros and Zednik must have been aware of the 
existence of emergency exits as a general feature of 
buildings, and therefore they must have been aware that 
emergency exits were likely to exist in the stores in 
which they worked.  A reasonable jury could not 
conclude otherwise. 
The question remaining is whether emergency 
exits were in fact available and unobstructed at the Wal-
Mart stores in question.  Wal-Mart has offered evidence 
of the availability and unobstructed nature of emergency 
exits in its stores.  Plaintiffs have not directly rebutted 
this evidence.  They have merely offered speculation that 
Wal-Mart had motive to conceal any emergency exits.  
But Plaintiffs do not actually demonstrate that the exits 
were absent or obstructed in any way.  Judgment in favor 
of Wal-Mart is appropriate. 
47 
 
Plaintiffs cannot succeed by advancing a defense 
that leaving through the emergency exit would trigger an 
alarm or potentially result in the loss of their jobs.  
Regarding the alarm, ―it is unreasonable for one whom 
the actor intends to imprison to refuse to utilize a means 
of escape of which he is himself aware merely because it 
entails a slight inconvenience[.]‖  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 36 cmt. a; Richardson v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D. Conn. 2001) (―The fact 
that opening the employee exit door would result in an 
alarm sounding and possible employee discipline does 
not give rise to an inference that actual confinement or 
threatening conduct took place.‖).  Nor is potential loss 
of employment a sufficient threat to constitute false 
imprisonment.  See Maietta v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
749 F. Supp. 1344, 1367 (D.N.J. 1990) (concluding an 
employee‘s concern that he would lose his job if he 
exited an interview with company investigators was 
insufficient to support a claim for false imprisonment 
under New Jersey law), aff’d 932 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 
1991); Richardson, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62 (―Moral 
pressure or threat of losing one‘s job does not constitute a 
threat of force sufficient to establish that plaintiffs were 
involuntarily restrained.‖). 
The only remaining issue is Zednik‘s claim that 
when he approached his manager and was denied 
permission to leave, he ―knew that [the manager] would 
assault [him] if [Zednik] tried to escape through any door 
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that would let [him] out.‖  Zednik asserts that the 
manager wanted the store clean for the impending visit of 
a Wal-Mart executive.  But Zednik‘s sole evidence of the 
manager‘s supposed violent tendencies is that the 
manager ―is a muscular man (with blond hair)[.]‖  We 
need not credit this statement in any way. 
In an earlier declaration, Zednik relates the 
toothache story and the request made to and denied by 
his manager, but curiously omits any belief that his 
manager would assault him.  It is only in his third 
supplemental declaration – filed only a few weeks after 
Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment – that Zednik 
mentions the prospect that his manager might randomly 
assault him.  Even on summary judgment, we need not 
credit a declaration contradicting a witness‘ prior sworn 
statements.  See Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
851 F.2d 703, 705 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Jiminez v. All 
Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 251-54 (3d Cir. 
2007) (discussing the sham affidavit doctrine).  While not 
precisely contradictory, Zednik‘s omission of such a 
crucial fact is highly questionable. 
But even absent these suspicious circumstances, 
we conclude that no reasonable jury could credit 
Zednik‘s speculative statement that his manager would 
assault him had he tried to leave.  Zednik offers no 
evidence in support of the statement.  He does not allege 
that the manager had a propensity for violence.  And he 
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does not allege that the manager overtly or impliedly 
threatened him.  Thus, summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
V. Conclusion 
Over the course of eight years and a minimum of 
four opinions, the District Court rejected final 
certification of an FLSA class, rejected the RICO claim 
on several grounds, and rejected the false imprisonment 
claim on the merits.  We will affirm. 
